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byWallace E. Hufi&nan andRichard E. Just
This paper presents one ofthe first-systematic treatments ofeconomic incentives in the
management ofacademic research and major inefficiencies in common funding mechanisms.
Building on well-known but unusual attributes ofresearch whereby the research payoff is only the
"best" ofscientists' outputs, payoffs are highly uncertain, asymmetric information exists on
scientists' effort, and scientists' are more risk averse thanadministrators, we consider how
incentives shouldbe structured to elicit optimal research effort and payoffs using a principal-agent
model withheterogenous ability acrossscientists. Wethenconduct a systematic analysis of the
implications from the model for the three major forms of agricultural experiment station funding-
external grant programs, incentive contractswith outsiders, and formula/program fiinding.
External competitive grant programs are shownto be a relatively inefficient funding mechanism.
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At least since the 1950s, studies have shown unusuallyhigh productivity of public agricultural
research (e.g., Griliches; Huf&nan andEvenson; Ruttan; Schultz). In response, many haveasked
whymore ftmds are not allocatedto public agricultural research. More recently, following the
large budget deficits of the 1980s, fimding conditions have tightened and forced both the
research agencies of the U.S. Department ofAgriculture and many ofthe state agricultural
experiment stations (SAES) into a contracting mode. Under unprecedented budget pressures,
administrators and public decision makers have struggled to set priorities to reduce budgets
without significant loss ofproductivity. In response, considerable debate has emerged over the
last decade about how to organize and manage agricultural research (e.g., Alston, Norton, and
Pardey; Huffman and Just 1994,1999a; Just and Huf&nan).
One school argues that priorities should be set at a national level and then competitive
grant programs should be used to allocate funds according to these priorities. Another school
argues that national priority settingmay ignoreresearch opportunities with local specificity or
non-national groups ofbenefactors, and that competitive grantsprogramshave high transactions
costs andfostertoo manyprojects with short-term andrelatively certain payoffs. Some limited
empirical workhas beenoffered supporting the latter view(Huffman and Just 1994,1999a).
Interestingly, the analysis of these issues to date has notproduced an explanatory theory.
2Progress has been largely to identify issues, canvass views, andexpress a priori impressions and
intuition.
There has, however, been a longer term debate about how best to foster, organize, and
manage agricultural research. Almost two decades agoT.W. Schultz (1980,1982,1983,1985)
spoke out against the tendencies for national priority setting and central.planningof agricultural
research, over-organization of institutional research, directing research from the top, requiring
elaborate documentation/justification ofresearch efforts, and treating/managing research as a
routine activity. Furthermore, he concluded: "Although money, facilities and competent
agricultural scientists are necessary to do worthwhile research, it is not a routine activity. It is,
indeed, a subtle, elusive human activity that is difficult to foster, promote and maintain."
[Schultz 1980, p. 16]
More recently Holmstrom and Levitt have identified unusual dimensions of the more
general umovation process that make setting efficient incentives for innovation relatively
difficult compared to industrial production or marketing. These differences mean that incentives,
management practices, and organizational structures thatworkwell for industrialproduction/
marketing cannotbe successfully applied to innovation because theywill stifle innovations.
Because academic research is undertaken to obtain discoveries and advances in knowledge, it is
innovative activity. Hence, incentives and organizational structures arevery important to an
efficient and effectiveorganization of agricultural research.
This paper presents a conceptual analysis ofsome oftheimportant issues in the
orgamzation and management ofacademic research. Inparticular, we apply principal-agent
theory to derive optimal compensation schemes for scientists when scientists differ in ability.
3risk aversion, cost ofeffort, and reservation utility, and toshow theoptimal trade-offbetween
institutional risk and scientists' abilities. Basedon the identified characteristics, we derive
implications for an efficient organization ofresearch. We show how scientists' incentives should
be structured to elicit optimal research efforts and direction, whether research directions should
be set at a centralized or decentralized level, andwhetherthe organization of researchshouldbe
through external competitive grants orprogram and institutional funding.
The Changing Structure of Incentives for Agricultural Research
Some dramatic changes havetaken place in the fimding of agricultural research mtheUnited
States sinceestablishment of theU.S. Department ofAgriculture, the founding of the land-grant
college system under theMorrill Actof 1862, and the institution of agricultural experiment
stations under the Hatch Act of 1887.
Displacement of Federal Funding by State Funding. In 1887,when the state
agricultural experimentstation (SAES) systemwas first given formal federal fimding by passage
of the Hatch Act, at least 82 percent of the funding was from the federal government. This share
dropped dramatically to 65 percent in 1900,25 percent in 1920^ 29 percent in 1960, and 26
percent in 1990. As the share of federal support has declined, the share of state support has
increased. The state funded share of SAES budgets increased from 20 percent in 1900 to
46 percent in 1920 and 58 percent in 1960. Since then, the state share of funding has decreased
somewhat to 55 percent in 1980 and 1990, and further to 50 percent in 1995.
An important point about implementation of state fimding was that it was provided
through institutional block grants or program grants to agricultural experiment stations or land-
grant universities, thus leaving the setting of directions and research program implementation to
4local land-grant orexperiment station authority (Hufftnan and Evenson). Amajor force behmd
the increase in state funding was the requirement instituted in 1935 ofmatching regular federal
funding with other, including state, fimding. To receive regular USDA fimding ofthe SAES,
states were required tomatch federal funds. An important effect ofthis requirement was to
provide long-run diversification inthe SAES funding portfoho, which generated a very
diversified public agricultural research system compared toother countries (see Huffman and
Just 1999).
Displacement of Regular Federal Funding by CompetitiveGrant Programs. While
funding for the USDA has contmued to be essentially all from the federal government (USDA),
the composition of the funding andmechanism for allocating federal fimds to the SAES system
havechanged (Huffmanand Just 1999a; Huffman andEvenson, pp. 21-23;Alston and Pardey,
Ch. 2; Committee on the Future of the Colleges of Agriculture in the Land-Grant University
System, Ch. 6). Historically a legislatedformulafor allocating federal appropriations to the
SAES systemwas used. Initially all states received equalappropriations, but the formulawas
modified over the period 1935-55 to depend on each state's share of total U.S. farm population
and total U.S. rural people.
After strong encouragement from the National Research Council, the USDA initiated a
Competitive Grants Programs to finance a small share of public agricultural research in 1977.
With serious federal budget deficit problems beginning in the 1980s, public pressxire mounted to
increase scrutiny of the efficiency and social usefulness of all public expenditures. An outgrowth
of pressure has been greater interest in and emphasis on priority setting at the federal level.
Arguments were advanced that SAES formula funding did not adequately reward productivity
5(or penalize non-productivity). One response was a substantial increase in funding for the
National Research Initiative (NRI) in 1986. Competition forNRI grants is opento all public and
private researchers.
In 1900,virtually all of the 64 percentof SAES fimding from the national government
came in the form ofUSDA formula funds. Within regular federal appropriations, there has been
a significant reduction in Hatch, Regional Research, andothernon-grant or "formulafimds" from
20.4percent in 1960 to 9.5 percent in 1996. Concurrently, competitive and special grant funds
have increased from zero in 1960 to 2.6 percent in 1996 (Huffman and Just 1999a; USDA).
Hence, the funding of agricultural research has clearly tended away from regular or formula
funds toward competitive grant flmding.
Increased Private Funding and Public-private Cooperation. Increasingly, in the
midst of budget crises, public agricultural research scientists have been encouraged by
administrators to pursue nontraditional sources of funding such as non-agricultural agencies,
private corporations, and commodity groups. Over the past two decades, SAES scientists in the
U.S. have turned increasingly to non-regular federal and private sector sources. In 1980, the
share of SAES system funding coming from nontraditional federal government sources was
11 percent. Some of these funds was distributed by the USDAthroughcontracts and cooperative
agreements. The rest was distributed through competitivegrants from the National Institutes of
Health, the U.S. Agency for International Development, theNational Science Foundation, the
U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services, the Public Health Service, and other agencies
primarily by competitive grants. This share increased to 12 percent in 1990 and 15 percent in
1995 (USDA).
6Public agricultural scientists are increasingly being encouraged to obtain funding from
private corporations and producer groups, including cooperatives. The privatesectorshare of
SAES funding was 7.5 percent in 1960,and increased to 9.2 percent in 1980and 14.3 percentin
1996 (Huffman and Just 1999a).
Summary. This brief account reveals that SAES fimdinghas become increasingly
diversified first to state as well as federal sources, then to non-agricultural government sources
and the private sector. As this change has taken place, the traditional formula allocation
mechanism ofboth federal and state governments has been increasingly displaced by competitive
grant fimding both from the USDA as well as other federal agencies and by the private sector.
Risky Production, Asymmetric Information, and the Principal-Agent Problem
ofAcademic Research
To understand the implications of some of the recent trends in the organization of agricultural
research and the potential insights offered by principal-agent theory, R&D must first be
recognized as a production process that has unusual attributes relative to the production and
marketing of industrial goods.
Key Attributes ofResearch. First, the R&Dpayoff is most accurately described as the
"best" of scientists' outputs, rather than theirtotal output. Second, the research production
process is subject to a large amount of exante uncertainty. No target discovery mayoccur, a
poor discovery may occur, or a great discovery might occur. Furthermore, unanticipated
discoveries frequently occur. Hence, payoffor value of a research project is unknown at the
outset oftheproject and output/quality is non-contractible. Third, asymmetric information exists
on scientists' effort. The scientist has much better information about howhe allocateshis effort
7and on his research ability than the research administrator. Hence, itis impractical for aresearch
administrator to monitor the effort ofscientists fully. Furthermore, given ex ante uncertainty in
the research production function, it is impossible for aresearch administrator to accurately mfer
effort from observed output/quality. Hence, amoral hazard arises in contracting on scientists
effort because the administrator cannot verify that scientists'efforts have met any agreed upon
contract terms. Fourth, administrators are less risk adverse than scientists because they manage a
much larger portfolio ofprojects. Each scientist may have one or two projects per period, but a
research administrator may have dozens orhundreds ofscientists inhis organization. With
different attitudes toward risk between administrators and scientists, potential inefficiencies arise
when scientists areexpected to beara large share of research risk.
Building on prior research by Holmstrom, Levitt, and Gibbons, principal-agent theory is
used to provide insights on efficient incentive contracting within an organization and across
organizations inan environment where contracts cannot be enforced by the courts. This
principal-agent model isable to accomplish this because the incentives are developed inamodel
where thejoint surplus of the research administrator (the prmcipal) andthe scientist (the agent) is
maximized, i.e., the optimal contract is incentive compatible in the sense that it is in the best
privateinterest of both the researchadministrator and scientistto voluntarilyfulfill the contract.
This means not only that there is no need for court enforcement of optimal contracts but also that
monitoring by the research administrator of the scientist's effort is unnecessary and
unproductive.
Modeling Research Incentives with Uncertain Payoffs. Before assessing implications
of recent trends in agricultural research, we sketch the basic model. First, the research
8administrator is assumed to observe the researchpayoff at the end ofa project, to compensate
scientists for their effort, possibly with a compensation package including a fixed salary and a
performance incentive, and tobe risk neutral about R&D payoffs.' For the purpose ofthis paper,
a research project is an attempt to develop a particular innovation ora fixed term contract to
conduct research in a particular area. The administrator's objective is tomaximize expected
R&D payoffnet of scientists' compensation.
Second, scientists areassumed to obtain utility from income, disutility from effort or
work, to be risk averse, and to havea reservation utility. More specifically, each scientist
(denoted by the subscript i) isassumed to have a quadratic cost ofeffort, c.(e.) = .5k.e.^ (which
generates a positive-sloped effortschedule withrespect to compensation), to haveconstant
absolute risk aversion (j);, to have a fixed certainty-equivalent reservation utility (Hi)» to
choose effort on research to maximize individual expected utility subject to attaining at least his
reservation utility.^
Third, each scientist is assumed to work alone (to avoid team or easy-rider problems) and
to undertake only one project per period that produces exactly one indivisible unit ofoutput, but
research quality is variable depending on his effort. Hence, the production function for quality
has one variable input, the scientist's effort. With productivity for doing research differing
across scientists, the marginal product of effortdiffers across scientists. Becauseofthe highly
uncertain nature of research, theproduction function for research is stochastic, having a scientist-
specific random component €; anda common institutional component 5. Thecommon shocks
might represent unanticipated bureaucratic orscientific problems orunanticipated advances in
9the publicstockof knowledge. Hence, the production function for research quality, which is the
payoffto the principal or administrator, is^
(1) yj = a^ Cj + 6) + 6
whereyj is quality of researchproduced by scientist i, Cj is scientist's effort, and a^ is the expected
marginalproduct of the scientist's effort. Differences in a^ across scientists reflects scientists'
abilities for research (e.g., creativity, efficiency ofmental processes, work routine — see Ladd
1987), organizational aspects of the research environment (e.g., bureaucratization ofprocedures),
and the available stock ofrelevant public knowledge.^ Each ofthe stochastic terms in the payoff
2 2function are assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance, o. and Og, respectively; and for
simplicity ofpresentation, ej and 6 are assumed to be vmcorrelated. The variance of the research
payoff is the summation ofthe two variances, =0^ +05.
In order to provide penetrating insights on incentives, we assimie that scientist's effort, ej,
is the only source of asymmetric information. It is imobservable to the research administrator
but known to the scientist. Research quality, yj, is assumed to be observable to both the
administrator and scientist but only at the end of the project. We permitmore than one scientist
towork independently on identical research projects, but only the highest quality output
contributes to the administrator's R&D payoff This might arise through the publication process
where an editor publishes the "best" paper on a topic given that it adds significantly to the state
ofknowledge, orthrough farmers using only the crop variety oranimal breed that has the "best"
anticipated performance.
Optimal Compensation ofPublic Research Scientists
10
Animportant research policy question is: What is the optimal scientist compensation scheme and
howdoes it depend on characteristics of scientists, research projects and the research
environment? To convey some basic results about optimal compensation and the associated
R&D payoff, we initially consider contracting between a research administrator (or funding
agency) andone scientist. According to principal-agent theory, whencontracting is repeated
manytimes and the agent has discretionin actions including the level and timing of effort, the
structure of the optimal pay scheme is linear in the observedprincipal's payoff (Holmstrom and
Milgrom; Levitt). Consider the two part compensation scheme: (i) a guaranteed payment or
salary, a^, that is independent of the observed R&D payoff, and (ii) an incentive payment that
amounts to a positive share, Pj, of the observed R&D payoff,
(2) Wi = ai + Piy,
A larger p, implies a "higher powered" incentive scheme. Substituting equation (1) into (2), the
structure of this pay scheme is linear in the scientist's effort,
(3) w,.(ei) = a; + PjaiCi + PjE; + Pi6.
Equation (3) depicts how ex ante uncertainty in the research productionprocess is transmitted
into ex ante incomeuncertainty for the scientist. Fromequation (3), the expectedwage
conditional on effort isE(Wj) = ttj + piaje,- and the wage variance is y(Wi) = p^ cof.
Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion for utility of the scientist, his
expected utility canbe expressed m terms of certainty equivalence as
(4) E[U^(e.)] = a. . p.a^e^
The research administrator's payoffnet of scientist's compensation is U. =yi(ej) - WjCe^) =
(l-p.)ajej +(1-p.)(e.-6j). Therefore, the expected net payoff is
11
(5) EH. = (l-p.)aje.-a.
Clearly if 0<p.<1, the expected netpayoffof theresearch administrator is positively related to a
scientists' effort, Cj, (and ability, aj). However, the administrator's expectednet payoff is
negatively related to the size ofwage guarantee or salaryof the scientist, a;.
The administrator chooses the parameters of the incentive scheme, a-, and pj, to maximize
his expected net payoffsubjectto the constraint that the scientist chooses effort to maximize his
expectedutility and that he attain at least his reservation utilitywhile contractingwith the
principal, i.e.,
(6) Max [(l-p.)a.ej-a.] s.t
"i. Pi
(7) Max (a^+ Pja.ej-5(|)jP^(i).) and
(8) af +Pi'a.e/ - 5k.ai^(ei')^ -.5 (t)j(Pi')a)f
Note that conditioning the administrator's problem insures that the scientist chooses a privately
beneficial effort rate when faced with the compensationscheme (i.e., incentive compatibility),
and will be offered a compensation package that he will accept (i.e., meets his reservation
constraint). In this model, it is unproductive for the administrator to offer a compensation
scheme that the scientist rejects because the administrator's expected payoff is zero, i.e.,
Eyi(0) = 0.
Because research risk is independent ofeffort in this model, theoptimization problem in
(6)-(8) can be solved sequentially. First, the optimal solutionto the scientist's decisionon effort
in equation (7) is
(9) e; =
12
which depends positively on the scientist's marginal product of effort (aj) andinversely on
hismarginal costof effort. Second, substituting equation (9)into (6)and(8)andchoosing ttj
and Pi, Kuhn-Tucker conditions (ordirect examination) reveal a boundary solution in (8),
E[Ui(ei')] = fij,implymg:
(10) a.' = fij-5pf(pj-rj)
where Pj = isa scientist-specific "research productivity index" and isa
scientist-specific "researchrisk index." Substituting (10) into (6) and (8) andmaximizing with
respect to P; reveals the optimal scientist performanceincentive,
(11) P" = Pi/(Pj+rj)
which, when substituted into (10), gives the globally optimal-guaranteed payment or salary,
(12) a"' = -.5pi^(p.-r.)/(p.+r.)^
With this optimal pay scheme, some notable results follow. First, the joint (certainty
equivalent) surplus of the administrator and scientist is maximized and both have an incentive to
fulfill the contract. Second, the administrator compensates the scientist for his effort at a rate that
provides partial insurance against income risk. With asymmetric information on the scientist's
effort, the administrator does not provide full-income insurance to the scientist because that
wouldprovideweak incentives for effort,most likely leading to shirking. Third, the salaryor
guaranteed component of a scientist's compensation is positively related to his reservation utility
fij, buthisreservation utility hasno impact on theincentive component. Fourth, ah increase in
the research risk index Tj decreases the optimal incentive, p.', and the optimal salary orpay
guarantee is increasing in theresearch risk index if and only if 3pi > Tj, which weargue later tobe
plausible.^ Thus, low research risk, low scientist risk aversion, low cost ofscientist's effort,
13
and/or highmarginal research productivity is sufficient to cause thesalary or guaranteed payment
to increase inresearch risk. Ifresearch is infinitely risky (i.e., ojf - ~o, - «»o), then p" =0,
and theoptimal pay scheme is a fixed salary equal to thecertainty-equivalent utility (i.e.,
Wj = =Hj). Inthis case, the administrator optimally bears, all the risk because he is risk
neutral and less risk averse than the scientist. Thus, an increase in research risk, rj, decreases the
importance of the incentive relative to the salary or guarantee. Fourth, an increase in theresearch
productivity index, pj, increases the optimal incentive, and it also increases the optimal salary or
guarantee if research risk is large relative to thescientist's research productivity.^ However, if
research risk is small relative to scientist's research productivity, the salary or guarantee will be
decreasing in scientist's research productivity.
Expected Benefits Under Optimal Incentives. To obtain further insights from our
principal-agent model ofoptimal research incentives, note the optimal effort of scientists is
(13) 6;' = ajp/[kj(pj +r.)],
the expected compensation of the scientist net of his cost of effort is''
(14) E[Wj(ej*)-Cj(e.')] = [.5 +^j(Pj +r.)]/(p. +^j)^
(whichis equal to the reservationwage plus the risk premium) and the expectedR&Dpayoff for
the research administrator net of the scientist's compensation is
(15) Enj(ei') = .5pf/(p(+ri)
If the scientist is risk neutral (i.e., (J); = =0), then equation (13) becomes aj/kj, equation
(14) becomes andequation (15) becomes .Sp; - H;. With asymmetric information on the
scientist's effort, the scientist's risk-averse attribute reduces the administrator's payoffand the
scientist's effort fi-om the first-best outcome.^ Some net R&D payoff (and research quality) is
14
foregone by the administrator in partially insuring the risk averse scientist against risk.
Furthermore, given the scientist's reservation wage H;, the scientist must also receive higher net
compensation because he must be paid to bear his part of the risk. Because he is more risk
averse than the administrator, the risk borne by the scientist is inefficient risk bearing. Hence,
only "second-best" resource allocation is attainable.
Equations (13), (14), and (15) reveal that arisk-neutral research administrator is better off
contracting with ascientist that has low scientist-specific research risk (i.e., o- is small) and low
risk aversion (i.e., small (t>i). The reason is that the scientist requires less compensation for
bearing risk and exerts more effort. Differentiating EEjCef) with respect to p; also reveals, not
surprisingly, that aresearch administrator is better offcontracting with ascientist that has higher
research productivity.^
Differentiating equation (14) with respect to Pj, the scientist receives larger expected net
compensation when his marginal product ofeffort is higher (a larger aj) and/or his marginal cost
ofeffort (kj) is lower.'" However, the effect ofrisk aversion on expected scientist compensation
is not clear. Differentiating (14) with respect to rj reveals that dE [w^ (ej') - C; (e^) ]/Sij >0for
certain only ifPj > rj." Thus, ifhis research productivity is low, the scientist fares better with
higher research risk and risk aversion. But ifhis research productivity ishigh, the scientist may
be betteroff with lower research risk and risk aversion. Perhaps, the result that scientistswho
have lowmarginal or opportunity costof effort (and possibly lowresearch risk) earn greater
compensation thanothers is surprising, but it is explained by the fact thatmore R&D payoff is
traded awayfor purposes of risk avoidance by those withhighopportunity cost of effort(and
15
highriskpremiums). Wenotethatthisphenomenon may notbeobserved in reality because
administrators tend not to hire or grant tenure to low-productivity scientists.
Some Implications for Funding Mechanisms
The attributes and mcentives ofalternative funding mechanisms, e.g., external peer-reviewed
competitive grants, incentive contracts, and block or program grants are different in ways that
affect scientists' effort, research quality, and efficiency of resource allocation across all academic
programs. This section examines each ofthese fimdingmechanisms heuristically from the
perspective of the model developed in the preceding section.
Peer-reviewed Competitive Grants Programs. From the perspective of the optimal
incentive contracting model, the peer-reviewed competitive grant mechanism is an inefficient
contract. First, the fimding/granting agencies attempt to operate independent ofacademic
institutions but impose significant externalities on the activities of scientists in academic
institutions. Resources are not allocated nor are incentives set to maximize the joint surplus of
the external funding agency (principal) and the scientists of academic institutions (agents), taking
accountof the riskiness ofresearch and attributes of scientists. For example, when extemal
funding agencies ask for researchproposals, the cost of proposal writing, which uses scarce
resources, is usually not funded so scientists' efforts goingto proposal writing are diverted from
other researchprojects reducing their expected payoff, from instruction/teaching activities which
reduces the expected achievement of students, or from leisure which is detrimental to their health
and personal life ofscientists. Thus, competitive grants programs are distortionary and generally
impose negative externalities on scientists other activities.
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Applying the Coase theorem, socially optimal resource allocation decisions carmot be
attained with externalities whenthe affected organizations/businesses attempt to makedecisions
independently (unless appropriate taxes orsubsidies are imposed). Instead the organizational
device to achieve socially efficient incentives is one thatviews theaffected organizations/
businesses as one combined decision-making-unit (also see Comes and Sandier, p. 86-89).
Although research proposal writing is a legitimate research activity, proposal writmg for new
projects should notdistort scientists' effort going into existing projects, teaching obligations or
leisure time. An important economic issueis what is theoptimal amount of resources to be
allocated to proposalwriting compared to conducmg research, writing reports, and preparing
manuscripts for publication. We hypothesize that in an organization ofscience large enough to
internalize all externalities, research proposal writmg and evaluation would receive considerably
less emphasis than when science is primarily funded by external peer-reviewed competitive grant
programs.
Second, the peer-reviewed competitive grant system places primary emphasis on the
quality of the research proposal which is imperfectly correlated with the uncertain research
payoffof the project. For most legitimate research proposals, nobodyknowswhat can be
discovered, and the principal-agent literature emphasizes thatwith asymmetric information the
scientist or agent hassuperior infonnation. Granting agencies, in contrast, proceed under the
assumption thatotherscientists, frequently not even working onclosely related research
problems, have superior information about the potential payoffofresearch projects (U.S. GAO).
Thus, these "peer" reviews and panels are frequently ill-positioned to accurately judge quality
and potential, andwhen theyare well informed, they tend to be too cautious in theirassessments
17
of research methods and potential. Theyalso tendto impose toomuchhomogeneity of
approaches which reduces the diversity of sampling from the discovery distribution, or to require
large amounts of uncompensated preliminary research results.
Third, granting agenciesdetermine the size of the awardup front based on the proposal
eventhough at that time nobodyknowswhat can or will be discovered or what unexpected
obstacles and delays may be encoimtered. Whether research quality is high or low, the scientists
receives the same award. This reduces the scientist's incentive to devote effort toward uncertain
discoveries, even if there is some chance of seeking later fimding through the same granting
agency.
Fourth, peer-reviewed competitive grant programs shift an unduly large share ofresearch
risk to scientists, who are in an inferior position for risk bearing. When these agencies do not
fund proposal writing and only a fraction ofproposals receive fimding, scientists bear significant
institutional risk of research. Furthermore, evenif a scientist is successful in getting a proposal
funded, the tradition of funding agencies is to cover significantly less than full cost of the
research project. Hence, with competitive grant funding, scientists face uncertainty about being
able to obtain enough resources to complete aproject. Even for a"funded scientist," projects
may be prematurely terminated or delayed indefinitely. For scientists who write proposals that
do not get funded, projects are also terminated prematurely ordelayed.
Within the principal-agent model of research incentives, the possibility ofpremature
termination ofprojects greatly weakens scientists' incentive for effort, including proposal
writing, and generally lowers the quality of research relative to optimal incentive contracting (see
Levitt and Snyder). Thus, the principal-agent model predicts low quality research proposals for
18
external competitive grants programs, especially when average awards are small. In fact, a
common complaint of external granting agencies is that a largeshareof the proposals they
receive are of poor quality.
Fifth, given the unusual attributes of research, themost efficient resourceallocation is
attainable when the principal (funding agency) andagents (scientists) are engaged in a long-term
relationship. In a long-termrelationship, problems stemming fromasymmetric information are
reduced because the administrator learns more about each scientist's ability and other
performance attributes and fine-tunes incentives to the riskiness of the research and attributes of
the scientist.
Thus, external granting agencies are in an awkward position for determining expectations
about the length (and amount) of funding for scientists' research. To the extent that peer-
reviewed competitive grant programs do not guarantee short- or long-term fimding to everyone
submitting a proposal, scientists' incentives for efforton proposals and fimded projects are
weakened. If funding ofa scientist with a competitive grant is a one-time event, theexpected
payoff is often quite low. However, to theextent thatfimding agencies guarantee "renewal of
successful" projects, they become less competitive and similar to a program funding mechanism.
In fact, the tradition ofthe National Science Foimdation has been one ofextensive competition
where the expected size ofawards is small, but little competition or emphasis on the quality of
research proposals where the expected size ofthe award islarge. These latter funds have been
allocated largely to scientists who have compiled long-term successful research programs in the
area where a large grant is to be made (see U.S. GAO for details).
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Although peer-reviewed competitive grant programs claim to attract the best talent to
theu" programs, this seems largely to be a subjective evaluation because little objective
examination has been Conducted (U.S. GAO; Chubin and Hackett). Even if these programs
attractmore able scientists, the model of this paper suggests that the relevant issue is whether the
increase in ability of fimded scientists is large enough to offset the weakened incentives for effort
toward discovery and the effect of imposing risk on scientist relative to alternative funding
mechanisms. These latter attributes ofgrant programs tend to reduce scientists' effort and
research quality possibly offsetting any gain in attracting more able scientists relative to
altemative funding mechanisms that have more efficient incentives directed toward optimal
effort.
Incentive Contracting with Outsiders. Research contracts between scientists and
external fimding agencies for research seem to have considerablepotential but also face
significant problems due to asymmetric information, especially in a short-term relationship. The
modelof this paper has dhect and important implications abouthow these contracts shouldbe
constructed. First, the optimal contract should contain "quality-based" incentives rather than
"cost-based" incentives. The incentive for quality encourages effort toward greater payoffwhen
the payoff is imcertain. Cost-based incentives tend to destroy economic efficiency just as in
standard revenue maximization models ofproduction. Additionally, cost-based incentives
encourage hiring second-rate scientists to carry-out research while first-rate scientists concentrate
on raising further research funds. As aresult, the expected research quality and ultimate research
payoff is lower than iffirst-rate scientists' time is focused on carrying out the research.
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Second, thepayoffof theproject should bedefined so that it provides an indication ofthe
broad nature of the desired discovery or innovation but is otherwise vague about the procedures,
channels, or routes to be pursued. This provides scientists withmany options for attaining
research success thus reducing research risk when the route to a successfiil discovery is
uncertain. Third, the contract should be structured to compensate scientists for effort with
optimal risk sharing. This means that contracts should be tailored to the riskiness of the research
project. With asymmetric information about scientists' attributes, however, it may be difficult to
design contracts that also take complete account of scientists' performance and preference
attributes that go into optimal incentive contracting (e.g., marginal cost of effort, reservation
utility, and degree of absolute risk aversion). This is a typical weakness of external contracting
when contractors do not have a history of interaction with scientists as in the following case.
Overall, quality-based incentive contracts for researchmay prove to be a relatively efficient
funding mechanism when the goal of an extemal funding agency is to "steer" or "give direction"
to research(Olson) as long as differences among the scientists so attractedare not great.
Program, Block Grant, or Formula Funding. Program, block grant, or formula
funding ofagricultural research institutions by national and state/provincial governments has
traditionally been animportant funding mechanism (Huffinan and Just 1999a, 1999b; Huffman
and Evenson). In the U.S., much ofthis research has been and is conducted in state agricultural
experiment stations. These institutions are part ofland-grant universities where administrator-
scientist relations are mamfest in hiring, promotion, and tenure policies. However, the research
administrator-scientist relationship is generally a long-term one and research administrators make
long-term commitments to fund part or all ofscientists' time/effort and provide complementary
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research resources, e.g., office space, research assistants, secretarial services, research equipment,
supplies, etc. Traditionally, scientists have prepared short research proposals onSAES tune for
projects of3-5 years in length with thepossibility ofextensions, renewals, and/or revisions.
Over thepastcentury, these proposals have primarily been reviewed for consistency with
institutional objectives and needs. Aside from scientists' time/effort covered by the agricultural
experiment station, the commitment of other resources hasgenerally been related to importance
of the project, the experienceand productivity of the scientists, and the financial status of the
SAES budget. Publications, trained graduate students, other scholarly outputs, and short annual
progress reports are expected from these projects. Thus, with formula and program-funded
research, relatively few resources are allocated to proposal writing and internal evaluation
relative to external competitive grant programs. Also, administrators have not seriously
monitored research efforts of individual scientists. Rather, the primary emphasis has been on
measuring and rewarding research payoffs. As a result, first-rate scientists' time is allocated
directly to the research activity.
Researchproductivity is typicallymeasured by external publications in professional
journals and books, patents, breeders' rights, doctorates trained, etc. Since the same institution is
employing thescientist for bothresearch and instructional and possibly extension services, few
non-internalized externalities exist across scientists' university activities.
The SAES administrators are in an advantageous position to select for theirresearch staff
scientists who seem tohave attributes that lead to large research payoffs because recruitment can
focus ontheattributes of scientists rather than attributes ofan immediate short-term research
project. They can then fine-tune incentives maway that isconsistent with the incentive
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contracting model presented in thispaper. The typical mterviewmg process notonly attempts to
identify highly productive scientists butalso scientists who have lowresearch risk, e.g., high
probability of getting tenure. The tenure review process also appears to beaneffort toweed out
scientists of low creativity/productivity and high risk.
Consistent with the model of this paper, incentivepayments have been an important
implicit component of scientist compensation contracts. While one-shot ex post incentive
payments have not been typical, permanentsalary increments (merit increments) basedon annual
and periodic promotion reviews ofpast performancehave been a fundamental part of scientist
compensation schemes. In effect, offering incentives in the form ofpermanent salary increments
rather than one-shot payments has provided administrators a way ofpaying large implicit
incentive payments with limited short-term budgets.
The extent to which administrators have sought initially scientists who have low
opportunity cost and low reservation utility is less clear but without doubt administrators in the
traditional SAES systemhave paid higher salaries to scientists who have generatedhigheroffers
elsewhere andhave, at times, offered higher salaries to attract scientists into specific fields that
are hard to fill, possibly because those fields have been perceived asmore risky. Notably, the
typical SAES location insmall, inland towns limits high opportunity costs caused by private
alternatives inlarge cities and coastal locations. Also, university salaries are typically low
relative to private sector alternatives for similar education and experience, which suggests that
the university salary structure leads to self-selection ofindividuals into academic research who
do not have extremely high reservation utilities or expectations for compensation.
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Arguably, administrators aremore interested inhighproductivity andmlowopportunity
costs and low risk aversion. We note, however, that scientists' productivity and risk aversion
tendto behighly correlated (positively andnegatively, respectively) withreservation utility
(altemative salary opportunity) and opportunity cost (wages earned by converting recreation time
intoconsulting activities). Thus,the process of identifying-scientists withhighproductivity, low
risk aversion, low reservation utility and low opportunity cost may be difficult and result in the
most important of these characteristics (e.g., productivity) dominating the choice.
Overall, viewed form the principal-agentmodel of this paper, we conclude that the
traditional functioning mechanism ofSASE formula and program funding from federal and state
governments parallels closely the characteristics of a socially efficient funding mechanism for
attaining high value research payoffs compared to other fimding mechanisms.
With the recent decline in traditional sources of SAES funding and current fad of activist
researchmanagement, some directors have chosen to implement new research policies that affect
the size of institutionalresearch risk facedby scientists. Suchpolicies are characterized by
abruptly termination of someresearch projects, fostering morecompetition for the use of federal
and state formula and program funds thereby reducing the amount and length of expected
fimding for each scientist and project, eliminating fimds for research assistants, and more directly
managing current expenditure of funds. Inthe principal-agent model ofresearch incentives,
these policy changes imply an immediate increase in theinstitutional riskiness of research. An
increase in institutional riskiness ofresearch, other things equal, implies a reduction in scientist's
effort, a reduction inthe expected R&D payoff ofthe SAES director, and a reduction inthe
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expected netcompensation of scientists. Hence, such policies appear to becoimterproductive
and to be a stepbackward from earlier SAES management policies thatwere less interventionist.
Conclusions
This paper haspresented an overview of theagricultural research establishment directed toward
delineation of important alternatives in agricultural research funding and specification of a
theoreticalmodel of related agricultural researchmanagement issues. Then a model ofoptimal
agricultural research management is presented emphasizingthe ex ante uncertainty of research
payoffs. The model draws heavily on previous work in management of innovative processes
generally but adds the important feature ofheterogeneousscientist ability. Results reveal that the
current movement toward external grant fimding rather than formula/program funding of SAES
research and more direct intervention in the research process by administrators may be counter
productive compared to procedures which focus primarily on incentive compatible reward
structures that emphasize research productivity ofvalue to the SAES. The reasons are that, in
moving from formula/program fimding to external grantfunding, (i) scientist time is taken away
fromproductive activities and allocated to proposal writing and evaluation, (ii) cost in the form
ofa proposed budget rather than research output is compensated, (iii) quality proposals rather
than quality research output is rewarded even though the two are imperfectly correlated, (iv)
compensation is determined ex ante necessarily eliminating quality from the incentive scheme,
(v) the riskmess ofresearch is imposed unduly on scientists, (vi) the highest quality scientists
tend to focus more ongrant-proposal writing leaving the actual research to scientists with less
experience, ability, and/or productivity, and (vii) peer review committees sometimes make
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erroneous judgements about project potential and frequently impose narrow views onresearch
approaches thuseliminating thebenefits of sampling diversity.
This paper is apparentlythe first to presenta formalized theory ofagricultural research
funding. Theimplications for current directions in funding aresignificant because the share of
fundsallocatedby apparentlyinefficientapproaches (grants) is increasing. As this direction
continues, agricultural research funds will tend to becomemore political and bureaucratic,which
tends to reduce sampling diversity and eliminate high-risk/high-payoffprojects. Typically,
Congress tries also to achieve non-scientific objectives by the way national grant funds are
allocated. As these objectives are superimposedon the grant-awardprocess, the inefficient
character ofgrant-fimded research is fiirther amplified. For example, the last roimd ofUSDA-
NRI research proposals required fourteen different forms or documents in addition to the project
description, references, and budget. Furthermore, each ofthese forms had very precise
guidelines aboutexactly what information was to be included, the orderof presentation, and
exact placement on the form. This bureaucratization of research tends to screen out more
creative andpotentially higher payoffprojects. If this dkection continues, larger shares of
research resources are required for overhead and more staffmust beemployed to shepherd
proposals through the system.
Because this paper represents an initial attempt to formalize a theory for agricultural
research management, more research is needed. Other aspects need to be thoughtfully examined.
For example, we have not considered the possibility of(i) team research projects and how to set
incentives when the contribution ofindividuals to team efforts is uncertain and information about
individual effort is asymmetric, (ii) how to set incentives in the presence of inter-regional
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externalities that are imperfectly mtemalized by the existing SAES system even inthe regional
research program (see Huffinan and Just 1999b), or(iii) scientists splitting their effort between
research and education/outreach activities.
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Endnotes
^ A risk neutral preference for administrators canbejustified by thinking of themasmanaging a
large portfolio ofprojects. The assumption of risk neutrality canbemodified butat significant cost
inadditional complexity of thepresentation. Relaxing thisassumption leads to little change in the
basicconceptual conclusions provided scientists aremore risk averse than administrators.
^ As a utilityfunction for scientists (the agents), we usean additively separable function whichhas
typically beenemployed to simplify obtaining solutions of principal-agent models (seeMas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green, pp.479-80).
^ Note that adding a scientist-specific constant term in equation (1) unnecessarily complicates the
derivation of important results while adding little in the case where the constant term is positive.
When the constant is negative, as it would be with significant fixed start-up costs, simple solutions
are difficult to obtain. This important topic is left for future research.
* While the model of this paper draws heavily on the previous work ofHolmstrom and Milgrom
and Levitt, it differs in the important respect whereby scientists have heterogeneous ability and
employing scientists of superior ability is one of the administrator's most important avenues to
success.
^ From equation (11), 5p"/5r. = -pj/(pj +Fj)^ <0, and from equation (12), da-'/dr- =
•5Pi^(3Pj -rj)/(Pj +r)^>0 if 3pj -r>0.
*From equation (11), 5pi"/8p; = r./(pj +r.) >0forpj,ri>0; andfi-omequation (12), 3a"/5pj =
-•5pi[p' +rj(3p. -2rj)]/(p. +rj)'<(>)0 ifp' +rj(3p. - 2r) >(<) 0andpj >0.
^The expected compensation is Ew (e,*) - .5pi^/(pj +rj) +
®Notethat p.>p.V(Pj+r.) =pjp/cp; +r^)] forpj,ri>0.
^From equation (15), aE[n(e;)]/ap. =Pir./(pj +r.)^ >Ofor p;, r, >0.
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From equation (14), 9E[Wj(ei')-Cj(ei')]/5p. = rJ.Spj +p.rj +Hj]/(Pj +r.)^> Oforpi,; >0.
From equation (14), dE[w.{e^) - Cj(ei')]/3rj =[.5pi^(pj -t) +MjpJ/Cpj >0 forpi>ri>0.
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